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Abstract
African economies are increasingly confronted with changing food and commodity markets,
due to globalisation, economic liberalisation and urbanisation. Subsequently, consumer prefer-
ences change. This poses new opportunities but also challenges to small-scale producers, trad-
ers and processors along agricultural value chains. The value chain is increasingly seen as an
important development framework, with contract farming being viewed as an instrument for
improving value chain performance by reducing transaction costs and risks and by building
trust in vertical cooperation. 
This paper uses the case study of the potato value chain in Kenya to examine these assump-
tions. It is shown that contract farming can be used to reduce transaction costs and risks, and to
improve the organisation and governance of value chains by creating stable business relation-
ships. Nevertheless, it is constrained by a number of market and institutional failures.
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1.   Introduction: Promoting Value Chains in Agricultural Development Cooperation
1.1 The importance of Value Chains for Agriculture and Rural Development 
In recent years, the international debate has refocused some attention to agricultural and rural
development, particularly in Africa. There is broad consensus that for instance the Millennium
Development goals can only be reached if the rural population is promoted. Rural economic
development involves the transformation of agricultural based economies into more urban
industrial and service-based economies. This changes the flow of resources and the trade of
goods, services, knowledge and information whereby (globally) coordinated and integrated
value chains will gain increasing importance (Humphrey, 2005). Despite successful examples
of integrating small-scale farmers into global value chains (a prominent one being Kenyan
export horticulture producers, see for instance voor den Dag, 2003; Muendo & Tschirley,
2004), the share of developing country smallholder producers in global supply chains is still
small. The potential exclusion of especially African producers from global value chains puts
them in a disadvantageous position (van der Meer & Kees, 2006). 518   Promoting the Kenyan Potato Value Chain: Can Contract Farming Help Build Trust and Reduce...
This tendency of exclusion is partly the reason why many development agencies are re-shaping
their approaches in order to promote agricultural growth and productivity in Africa. Value
chain development is viewed as an effective way of fostering rural and agricultural develop-
ment. The importance of a vibrant private sector for rural development is widely acknowl-
edged and is today an integral part of the development agenda. As for German development
cooperation, GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) is gaining experi-
ence in working with value chain promotion in a number of agricultural and economic devel-
opment projects. In Africa, projects in Ghana, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Zambia,
and the Republic of South Africa promote value chains, most of them dealing with food items
(see also http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/fachliche-netzwerke.htm for more information
about an Africa-wide working group on agricultural economic development, projects and
countries involved, and training courses and material offered).
Currently, most African countries apply a twofold approach to rural development: a) a rural
livelihoods approach to cater for the set of cross-sectoral and social factors and b) a strong pro-
motion of private sector activities to support production and marketing. Experiences in a
number of countries show that a key success factor lies in the re-definition of roles of public
and private sector actors along the value chains. At a minimum, the public sector should pro-
vide an enabling environment (legal, political, and economic) for the private sector to under-
take (agri) business activities; whereas the private sector needs to improve its efficiency and
competitiveness. Farmers need to strengthen their technical, organizational and collective
action capacities so as to actively and profitably participate in, and influence the governance of
value chains and national economic policymaking. The ability, willingness and (incentive)
mechanisms of public, private and civil society actors to jointly develop an economically effi-
cient, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable agricultural sector is pivotal .The
value chain concept provides one framework for facilitating this public-private-farmer (and
others) collaboration or partnership (Merlin, 2005). 
1.2. Conceptualising the Value Chain Approach 
The Global Value Chain Initiative at the IDS, University of Sussex, describes the value chain
as a range of activities that are required to bring a product from its conception, through its
design, its sourced raw materials and intermediate inputs, its marketing and its distribution to
the final consumer (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). It incorporates production, transportation,
transformation, processing, marketing, trading, retailing and consumption of a given product
or service (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2003). It is thus a valuable tool in economic policy develop-
ment and implementation and provides an analytical framework for understanding margins of
value addition, income distribution and the levers of market power. Additionally, the metaphor
of the chain emphasises the fact that most goods are produced by a sequence of interlinked
actors and activities. The approach focuses on the analysis of the institutional arrangements
that link the various economic players (i.e. trust, contracts, degree of vertical and horizontal
coordination and integration). Following the value chain approach engages stakeholders in an
action-oriented method that acknowledges the linkages in the chain with a flexible implemen-
tation (Merlin, 2005). When engaging in internationally traded products, e.g. fresh fruit andHeike Höffler   519
vegetables, following the value chain is the only feasible way to fully depict the complex chain
linkages, flows of resources, knowledge and logistics (Humphrey, 2005).
Illustration 1. Promoting Value Chains in Development Cooperation 
Source: Own compilation, adapted from Mayoux (2003) and Merlin (2005)
In most cases, the starting point for value chain promotion is a targeted market analysis (illus-
tration 1). The centrepiece of the approach is the participatory chain mapping exercise, in
which representatives from all involved processes develop a joint understanding of the respec-
tive chain (and at which occasion market analysis can usefully be presented and discussed).
These exercises already reveal interesting insights, strengths and weaknesses of the value
chain. More than often, such workshops form a starting point for mutual trust-building among
key players of the industry. Discussions evolving around input quality, logistic arrangements or
product standards often help producers to understand the demand for their (raw-)product. Lis-
tening to processors and consumers can be an eye-opener for producers and traders, when it
comes to consumers’ needs, the right quality, the right quantities at the right time and in the
right place. Analysing the chain jointly can demystify a number of negative perceptions (such
as “middlemen exploit us”, or “farmers always breach the contracts”) and contribute to trust
building. Pointing out the weaknesses in the chain can help shaping the roles of public and pri-
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2.   Can Contract Farming Help Build Trust and Reduce Transaction Risks within Value
      Chains?
2.1 Institutional Failures in African Food Markets
Food value chains in Africa are facing numerous challenges namely: market failures (including
monopolies, asymmetric information and inadequate infrastructure), policy failures (including
lack of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks, incentive mechanisms and favourable
business environment) and more than often, massive capacity problems (of farmers and farmer
organisations, the private and public sector actors) (Ruben et al., 2006). Whilst traditional cash
crops in many countries seem to have established fairly organized supply chains, many still
suffer from excessive government intervention, (depending on the degree of market liberalisa-
tion). Newly emerging export crops on the other hand are often driven by foreign private com-
panies and have managed to develop fairly integrated chain structures that sometimes tend to
exclude poorer smallholder farmers (e.g. cut flowers). As for domestic food crops, they are yet
to be taken seriously and yet they are projected to constitute the biggest future market for Afri-
can agricultural producers due to increasing population and urbanisation (Ayieko et al., 2005).
Other problems abound: Markets for farm inputs often fail and the farther a farm is from an
urban centre, the less likely is adequate access, availability or affordability of farm inputs; scat-
tered smallholder farms, limited storage facilities and poor infrastructure affect quality and
marketable quantities of the produce; the market value of most produce is subject to very lim-
ited negotiation, given that many farmers limit themselves to price-takers while selling indi-
vidually to middlemen at the farm gate; the absence of standards, regulation and competition
for some products increases the potential for fraud and results in significant mistrust between
farmers and traders; fresh food marketplaces often turn out to be rather chaotic spot markets
characterised by terrifying hygienic conditions, which account for significant post-harvest
losses. 
2.2 The Case of the Kenyan Potato Value Chain
During the past 15 years, population growth and land flight led to high urbanisation in Kenya.
Simultaneously, modest (urban) income growth has changed food consumption patterns.
Increasing incomes stimulate the demand for higher value food items, such as dairy products,
meat, fresh fruit and vegetables (Ayieko et al., 2005). Maize, the number one staple food is
gradually substituted by wheat, rice and potatoes (Muyanga et al., 2005). Irish potatoes (Sola-
num tuberosum) are cultivated by approximately 500,000 smallholder farmers. During the past
decade, farmers doubled potato production from 500,000 tons to more than 1 million tons
annual production. Although potatoes increasingly provide many households with income, the
development of this sub-sector is constrained by a number of factors: the quality of the produce
is sometimes poor, consumer prices seem to be higher than production costs would suggest and
demand often outstrips supply, meaning that the sector is still under-exploited (Ayieko et al.,
2005). The potato chain is fragmented, characterized by little cooperation and integration, car-
tels, high transaction costs, deep mistrust, price inefficiencies and quality losses (Kirumba etHeike Höffler   521
Al., 2004). Weak rural-urban linkages and poor rural infrastructure additionally contribute to
the low competitiveness (Hoeffler & Maingi, 2005). 
In October 2003, the Ministry of Agriculture and GTZ facilitated the first participatory potato
chain mapping workshop, at which input suppliers, potato producers, middlemen, transporters,
traders, private companies and relevant public institutions were represented. Participants were
facilitated to develop a joint understanding of the areas that needed interventions and to build
consensus on the roles, public and private, rural and urban actors needed to play. 
Illustration 2. Weaknesses in the Kenyan Potato Value Chain
Source: Own compilation after Participatory Chain Mapping Exercise 
The jointly developed picture of the potato chain (illustration 2) revealed the following: 
1. low productivity due to absence of inputs and improved seeds;
2. high transaction costs due to prevailing mistrust between farmers and traders,  resulting
in low number of repeated transactions;
3. inefficient marketing due to the presence of cartels, lack of market information, and
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4. policy failure reflected for example by un-coordinated collection of cess or levies on
roads and product markets (which is additionally prone to bribery and corruption)
resulting in over-taxation; and
5. lack of legal and regulatory framework as well as grades and standards.
The workshop concluded with a sequence of resolutions and an action plan. Several task forces
were constituted and subsequently formed a national potato growers and marketing associa-
tion, started lobbying for better production and marketing services, developed and imple-
mented a seed improvement strategy, drafted a legal notice for potato marketing standards and
developed ideas how to meet the challenges arising around cess collection, competition and
market entry barriers (Hoeffler & Maingi, 2005). However, there were few suggestions and
ideas on how to address the risks of transaction due to lack of trust between producers, traders
and processors. Contract farming was seen as a possible solution. But can it help in reducing
risks and building trust?
2.3 Potential Benefits and Risks of Contract Farming 
Contract farming is defined as “an agreement between farmers and processing and/or market-
ing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements,
frequently at predetermined prices” (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). Contract farming occurs in dif-
ferent forms and involves different actors. The only structural commonality in contract farming
is the existence of a contract between the smallholder and the ‘agribusiness firm’, which could
be private, public, parastatal or farmer-owned. The content of the contract will vary, but typi-
cally, the grower provides land, labour and sometimes tools or equipment, but is supplied with
inputs like fertiliser, seeds, insecticides, credit as well as extension, marketing and transporta-
tion services by the agribusiness firm. Additionally, prices, quality standards, quantity to be
supplied, the technology to be used, the crop to be cultivated and work routines are often pre-
determined before planting, with the grower’s task mainly centred on harrowing, weeding,
applying fertiliser and chemicals, harvesting and abiding by the rules of the contract (Watts &
Little, 1994).
During the past 15 years, experiences have been gained and research has been conducted in the
field of contract farming and its potential to link African farmers to markets, particularly glo-
bal value chains (with products such as green beans, cut flowers, fish and honey (Eaten &
Shepherd, 2001; Ruben et al., 2006)). The degree of formalisation of the contractual arrange-
ment varies according to the nature of the product and the relationship of the business partners.
Buyers and producers might cooperate irregularly based only on verbal agreements or might
have developed a more formalized system that specifies the transactions and responsibilities of
both parties in a written, legally binding document. In the case of smallholder producers, the
contractual arrangements might be made with individual farmers or with farmer groups, pro-
ducer associations or cooperatives (Ochieng, 2005b).
Scholars have been divided on the merits of contract farming. Some view it as a mutually ben-
eficial institutional arrangement that introduces the smallholder to modern technology and
managerial skills, high-value crops, lucrative markets, cheap credit and regular cash flow, andHeike Höffler   523
enables the agribusiness firm to access cheap land and labour, and raw materials of acceptable
quality and quantity (Ayako et al., 1989). Others view it as an exploitative relationship in
which agribusiness firms due to their command of markets, control of input facilitation and
lobby power, exercise disproportionate power in bargaining and use this to exploit growers by
shifting market risks and the burden of standards to the grower, by encouraging mono-crop-
ping, deforestation, and production practices that create pollution and by substituting cash pro-
duction for food crop production leading to food shortages and poor nutrition. 
However, as Goldsmith (1985) and Ochieng (2005a) have demonstrated, contract farming by
itself is neither good nor bad: the extent to which it becomes efficient and equitable depends on
the socio-economic and political structures and relationships in which it is embedded. The fun-
damental characteristic of contract farming, from which it derives its potential advantages and
disadvantages, is that it insulates to a certain extent producers from open market forces. Thus,
the division of value added and margins between smallholder farmers and agribusiness firms is
less based on the interaction between supply and demand, but rather reflects social-economic
relationships and bargaining strengths of both contract parties.  (Ochieng, 2005a). Conse-
quently, the analysis of prevailing social and institutional arrangements deserves particular
attention.
2.4 Contract Farming Arrangements for the Kenyan Potato Chain?
Kenya has one of the most extensive contract farming history in sub-Saharan Africa covering
over a million farming households involved in the contract production of tea, sugar, coffee,
tobacco, flowers, fruits and vegetables. Coffee, tea and sugar constitute the biggest contract
schemes, involving nearly 600,000, 360,000 and 100,000 smallholders respectively. By 2002,
contract farming accounted for 60% of tea, 60% of sugar and 80% of tobacco production in
Kenya (Ochieng, 2005a). 
Despite this extensive contract farming background, there are only few reported contractual
arrangements in the Kenyan potato chain. Out of these few, all of them are between crisp and
chips processing companies and producer groups. Based on the knowledge of failing potato
spot markets and the potential benefits from contract farming, the assumption was that contract
arrangements are well placed to overcome some inefficiencies in the potato value chain. Fur-
thermore, it was assumed that given the potential benefits from contract farming producers as
well as processors would aim at stable contractual business relations. Additionally, a number
of factors usually referred to influence contract farming positively apply to the potato case: the
bulky and perishable nature of the product fosters that processors engage in transportation
arrangements; the long distance from interior production areas to marketplaces makes contract
farming additionally attractive; the rather demanding production techniques and susceptibility
of the product to diseases and pests sets a strong incentive for producers to seek involvement of
processors in the provision of extension services and specific inputs, which are needed to pro-
duce the desired quality; and the low seasonality of supply additionally qualifies for stable con-
tract relationships with the industry. 524   Promoting the Kenyan Potato Value Chain: Can Contract Farming Help Build Trust and Reduce...
However, empirical evidence suggests that even though both sides might aim at it, it is appar-
ently very difficult to realise the benefits in real business matters (Strohm & Hoeffler, 2006).
Despite the participatory value chain analysis having revealed a number of risks and problems
that could potentially be overcome by contractual arrangements (illustration 2), the factual
existence and positive experience with contract farming is surprisingly low. The main reason
for this is the occasional strong market demand for the product. Farmer groups are too tempted
to breach contracts and sell to other traders at times of high prices and consequently put proc-
essors at high risk when having invested in forward contracting. The anticipated preference of
farmers for stable prices and risk reduction doesn’t seem to apply in this relatively competitive
market. Enthusiasm for predetermined future prices is surprisingly low. Depending on the
accessibility of road and telecommunication networks, farmers seem to have a strong under-
standing of their bargaining position. The closer to different market outlets, the less likely
seems to be a trusting contract relationship. In fact, one processing company engages in con-
tracts only with groups that are far off the roads and not covered by mobile telephone net-
works, in order to limit the possibilities that another trader or processor would source potatoes
from them, which a) illustrates the level of mistrust even in contract relationships and b) dem-
onstrates the importance of relatively imperfect markets –in this case geographically induced
monopoly to the sustainability of contract farming). Given the high demand and need for uni-
form quality of the product, processors value repeated and regular business transactions more
than producers. Some farmer groups seem to aim rather at investing more into storage facilities
to enable regular supply of the produce and to sequence their supply over time.
Social factors such as ethnic cohesion, educational level and business acumen seem to play
additionally strong roles and determine the level of business understanding and trust. Proces-
sors report that in some potato growing areas, the educational level of producers and their atti-
tude to farming as a business is too low to understand and qualify for formal contractual
arrangements. In turn, farmers state that they find it particularly difficult to trust traders and
processors that are from far away towns, belong to a different ethnic group and are not bound
by any social relationship to the producers. This is particularly the case if the processing com-
pany is owned and/or managed by Asian Kenyans or foreigners (Strohm & Hoeffler, 2006).
This suggests a social capital failure.
3.   Conclusion: Opportunities and Limitations for Contract Arrangements in Kenyan
      Food Value Chains 
Contract farming has the potential to successfully link actors along a value chain, to build trust
(or substitute for it through for instance monopolistic concessions or power) and to reduce
risks in business transactions. However, the potential benefits depend on a complex set of fac-
tors, ranging from the nature of the product, socio-economic relationships to structure of prod-
uct demand.
Experiences from promoting the potato value chain in Kenya suggest that if business partners
are facilitated to develop a joint understanding of inefficiencies, causes of mistrust, and cost
drivers along their value chain, many of the problems can be solved. Facilitating contract
arrangements is thereby only one tool amongst others. However, it needs the initiative andHeike Höffler   525
willingness of actors to open up and change the way of doing business; i.e. producers need to
explore forward integration by forming formal marketing groups or companies and cooperate
more with processors or for traders and processors to enter contractual arrangements with pro-
ducers (Ochieng, 2005b). In Kenya, potato farmers have realised that producing for marketing
chains requires a certain degree of organisation, of mutual trust and reliable two-way informa-
tion and communication up-stream and down-stream along the value chain in order to respond
to market incentives. Again, contractual arrangements are only one instrument to build trustful
business relations with the industry. Trainings in organisational development, farm economics
and group leadership skills are found to be the most effective support to producers interacting
with the industry. Another effective instrument is the facilitation of visits for farmers to
processing companies to expose them to the value addition processes and to demonstrate the
need for uniform quality of the produce and other processing requirements. Among the food
industry, there is willingness to financially engage in such initiatives (Strohm & Hoeffler,
2006).
Analytical work in various other value chains, e.g. fish, export horticulture, dairy or cotton
(Schuurhuizen et al., 2006; Global Development Solutions LLCTM, 2004) suggest that similar
problems prevail. Field appraisals suggest that moderated value chain promotion could lay the
necessary foundation to improve business interactions in many other commodities. However,
more research is needed 
a) to better understand bargaining behaviour of business partners; 
b) to comprehensively analyse real and perceived transaction costs and transaction risks
and subsequent potential benefits of contractual arrangements;
c) to develop a better understanding of the value of trust, social capital investments and
the benefits of repeated transactions; and
d) to analyse the incentives for and success factors of longer-lasting mutual business rela-
tionships. 
All this could help identify the necessary public and private support measures to trust building
and risk reduction. This will eventually lead to better-targeted business, as well as develop-
ment approaches – making agricultural value chains more competitive and contributing to rural
development in Africa.
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